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Some analytic metaphysicians maintain that essentialism—the thesis that individuals 
or kinds have intrinsic properties or essences—is applicable to biological species. As 
such, tigers would have intrinsic properties that make tigers the type of animal that they 
are (these properties also distinguish tigers from other large cats, e.g. lions). However, 
drawing from empirical research about various populations of “species,” biologists and 
philosophers of biology have argued that essentialism is false because there are no such 
properties. That is, tigers, lions, and so on, do not have any essential properties. 
Nevertheless, there seems to be something right about making a robust distinction 
between tigers and lions, one that does not just depend on arbitrary constructed 
distinctions. Thus, even if we accept the empirical research (which we should if we are 
responsible philosophers) is there anything that can be salvaged from our concept of 
species? According to Samir Okasha, philosophers of biologists have only knocked down 
one form of essentialism, namely, intrinsic essentialism—that is, the type of essentialism 
we have discussed thus far. However, Okasha maintains that there is another type of 
essentialism, namely, relational essentialism, which is compatible with the research. On 
this version of essentialism, the essences of species are not constituted by intrinsic 
properties, but relational properties, for example, the property of “population x being able 
to interbreed with population y, but not z.” In what follows, I explain Okasha’s relational 
essentialism about species, and then I briefly indicate a brief problem for his account. 
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2. Defeating Intrinsic Essentialism 
 
According to analytic metaphysicians such as Kripke and Putnam, kinds have 
essences. For example, lemons have a certain genetic code that is constitutive of their 
lemonhood. It is not a coincidence that such a conception of essence is reminiscent of 
Locke, for Kripke and Putnam accept Locke’s nominal essence/real essence distinction. 
Recall that according to Locke, the nominal essence of a substance consists of its 
“superficial characteristics” upon which arbitrary human classifications are based.1 The 
real essence of a substance is the underlying structure that gives rise to the nominal 
essence. Unlike Locke, however, Kripke and Putnam maintain that the real essences of 
things can be discovered by science, e.g. the genetic code of a lemon.2 Moreover, Kripke 
and Putnam maintain that human classifications (i.e. nominal essences) are not arbitrary 
in the sense that they actually are trying to get at the real essences of things. “There is an 
implicit agreement among users of a natural kind term that the term really refers to 
whatever underlying microstructural properties are causally responsible for the 
observable properties used in classifying.”3 As such, real essences are not “semantically 
inert.”4                      
 Given that Kripke and Putnam think that real essences can be discovered by science, 
essentialism, then, must be responsible to the relevant empirical research. But according 
to Okasha, at least in the case of species, such real essences do not exist.5 Before we 
                                                
1 Okasha, “Darwinian Metaphysics,” p. 195 
2 Ibid. p. 194 
3 Ibid. p. 195 
4 Ibid. p. 194 
5 Note: analytic metaphysicians regard species as natural kinds, but philosophers of 
biology regard species as individuals. Okasha says that he will still refer to species as 
kinds, though he claims that his argument does not depend on it. 
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tackles Okasha’s criticisms of intrinsic essentialism, let us be clear about what intrinsic 
essentialism about species is. Following Okasha, we will use David Hull’s formulation of 
the thesis:  
Each species is distinguished by one set of essential characteristics. The possession of 
each essential character is necessary for membership in the species, and the 
possession of all the essential characters sufficient.6 
 
Okasha raises two types of objections to this definition. First, Okasha points out that in 
some some cases, species cannot be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions. Sibling species, for example, are “morphologically indistinguishable (or very 
nearly so) but treated as distinct because they form separate reproductive communities – 
they engage in little or no interbreeding.” That is, there are cases of two populations that 
are overtly identical (i.e. they have the same nominal essence), yet they fail to interbreed 
with each other. Polytipic species, on the other hand, “comprise populations of organisms 
that are phenotypically very different from each other, but treated as con-specific because 
they interbreed freely”7—to put it in essentialist terms, they have the same real essence, 
but not the same nominal essence. Clearly, these sorts of variations in nature do not bode 
well for the essentialist picture, especially if nominal and real essences can be separated 
from each other in the ways just indicated. Recall, real essences are supposed to explain 
nominal essences; however, the above cases show that this does not always hold. Second, 
Okasha claims that it is just false that members of species share a unique genetic 
property.8  In particular, Kripke and Putnam are working with the false assumption that 
species can somehow be defined in terms of their DNA, and that any properties extrinsic 
                                                
6 Hull, “Contemporary Systematic Philosophies,” 313. 
7 Okasha, “Darwinian Metaphysics,” p. 196 
8 Ibid. 
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to this DNA are mere accidental properties.9 Thus, Okasha concludes that Putnam and 
Kripke are flat out wrong that species have an underlying essential internal structure or 
genetic code. 
3. Relational Essentialism 
 
Though Okasha rejects intrinsic essentialism, he doesn’t think that Kripke and 
Putnam are entirely wrong: 
There is no real puzzle here, nor any need to posit unknown genetic essences. For the 
anti-essentialist considerations reviewed above only show that species cannot be 
defined in terms of essential properties, if those properties are meant to be intrinsic 
properties of the species’ members.10 
 
According to Okasha, we can provide an account of relational essentialism that can 
survive the criticisms raised against intrinsic essentialism. It is important to note that 
relational essentialism is not merely a philosophical speculation. According to Okasha, 
when we examine empirically grounded research about species, we will see that (for the 
most part) biologists in fact define species in terms of their relational properties. Thus, 
analytic metaphysicians have been misled in thinking that biologists even try to define 
species in terms of intrinsic essential properties. Okasha considers four concepts of 
species at play in modern biology: 
(1) Phenetic: species are largest group of members that have a minimum similarity to 
each other 
(2) Interbreeding: species are groups of interbreeding populations 
(3) Ecological: species are populations that have certain ecological niches 
(4) Phylogenetic: species have a certain evolutionary history 
 
As I have just suggested above, not all modern concepts of species are relational; in 
                                                
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. p. 199 
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particular, (2)-(4) are relational concepts, whereas (1) is not. The phenetic concept tries to 
define species in terms of the minimal similarities that they have to each other (for 
example, shared genetic or morphological properties), whereas, the interbreeding, 
ecological, and phylogenetic concepts define species in relation to another population or 
thing (e.g. niche or evolutionary history). The interbreeding concept tells us that species 
have the relational property of “being able to interbreed successfully with one group of 
organisms and not another.” The ecological concept claims that species have the 
relational property of “occupying a particular ecological niche.” Finally, according to the 
phylogenetic concept, species are related to a “particular segment of the genealogical 
nexus.”11 
Though Okasha favors the relational concepts, he acknowledges that all four concepts 
have problems. The phenetic has to deal with the issue of imprecise and differing 
methods for measuring similarities, which can lead to inconsistent taxonomies of species. 
The interbreeding concept cannot explain populations that are asexual. The ecological 
concept has not provided a satisfactory account of an ecological niche, which can lead to 
a similar problem faced by the phonetic concept, namely, inconsistent taxonomies. And 
finally, the phylogenetic concept faces epistemic concerns about reconstructing 
evolutionary history.12 Nevertheless, Okasha claims that biologists overwhelmingly reject 
pheneticism, and thus favor one of the relational concepts. Despite the difficulties with 
the relational concepts, then, the thought is that biologists will eventually settle on one of 
these relational concepts or an amalgamation of them. As such, this implies that species 
do not have essential properties because, 
                                                
11 Ibid. p. 200 
12 Ibid. p. 201 
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None of these properties [i.e. those entailed by (2)-(4)] is intrinsic to the organisms 
possessing them, nor supervenes on any of their intrinsic properties. Two molecule-
for-molecule identical organisms could in principle be members of different species, 
on all of these species concepts.13 
Given the above considerations, Okasha concludes that species do not have essential 
intrinsic properties, but essential relational properties. Thus Kripke and Putnam are on the 
right track in regarding “morphological criteria [nominal essences] as indicative of 
something deeper; their error lies only in a mistaken view of what that ‘something 
deeper’ is.”14 
4. Relations without Relata?  
As we have seen, Okasha thinks that species are defined in virtue of various relational 
properties they instantiate in virtue of relating to another population or thing (e.g. niche 
or evolutionary history) in a particular way. As such, this is supposed to show that 
intrinsic essentialism is false. However, it seems that Kripke and Putnam could respond 
to Okasha by claiming that he has just developed their account and further proven that 
species do in fact have intrinsic essential properties. The objection would work as 
follows. We cannot have relations without relata. Thus, in order for the interbreeding 
relation to be properly ascribed to a species, there must be something about the species 
that allows for this relation to hold. As such, the intrinsic essentialist can merely used the 
relations that Okasha points out to try to narrow down the essential intrinsic properties of 
a species. In this case, she can say that the essential intrinsic properties of a species is the 
“genetic code” that allows for a species to interbreed among its members, yet not 
interbreed with other populations. And in the case of the phylogenetic concept, the 
                                                
13 Ibid. p. 201 
14 Ibid. p. 203 
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intrinsic essentialist could say that it is not merely in virtue of relating to a particular 
piece of evolutionary history that a population can be designated as a distinct species, but 
a population relates to that bit of evolutionary history in virtue of having an intrinsic 
property that is constitutive of that period of evolution. The basic thought behind the 
objection is that the relations of (2)-(4) are only possible in virtue of holding between two 
relata, and these relata can only constitute intrinsic properties.15 Hence, intrinsic 
essentialism. 
                                                
15 The objection is effectively the same one raised against eliminativist versions of 
structural realism. That is, how can structural relations exist without relata?  
